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The contemporary geopolitical landscape is defined by contrasting national strategies regarding the energy transition and international insertion. The United States’ approach is increasingly characterized by an inward-focused industrial policy and by the use of tariffs and trade barriers to contain China’s technological rise.
In this context, the architecture of global climate governance suffered a seismic jolt under the Trump administration, culminating in the formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Yet this U.S. retrenchment did not produce an absolute vacuum; rather, it opened space for a global strategic realignment: the global energy transition has evolved from a purely environmental imperative into a central arena for geopolitical reconfiguration.
China has seized this opportunity by projecting the image of a reliable partner, in contrast to Western unpredictability. Instead of following the U.S. example, the country reinforced its climate commitments—such as the pledge not to build new overseas coal projects—and positioned itself as a stable and responsible great power, in sharp contrast to Washington’s erratic environmental policy.
The growing perception of China as a more dependable partner, combined with its massive foreign direct investment, has led an increasing number of countries to draw closer to Beijing. We are speaking of more than USD 227 billion in Chinese green-manufacturing projects abroad, with 88% of this capital committed since 2022.
Thus, U.S. inaction not only left an empty space; it actively encouraged nations of the Global South to seek a partner already attracting them with investment and technology, accelerating a convergence of interests across the Global South.
China has positioned itself as the largest investor in renewable energy in emerging economies, financing more infrastructure projects than any other nation. As Chinese capital and technology flow into these regions—over 75% of all Chinese green-manufacturing projects are located in the Global South—they create integrated supply chains and establish new productive and technical standards.
2. “Ecological Civilization” and the Sino–Brazilian Ecological Partnership
China’s global expansion in clean technology is not merely an economic maneuver; it is grounded in a robust and coherent ideology: the concept of “Ecological Civilization”(生态文明, shēngtài wénmíng), advocating harmonious development between humanity and nature and offering an ideological orientation for the Chinese industrial sector to pivot toward green technology.
the vision of “leaving future generations blue skies, green fields, and clean waters” positions China’s international insertion as an extension of its domestic environmental commitments. And this ideological basis is linked to tangible action. China has achieved overwhelming dominance across the green-technology supply chain. Chinese companies hold more than 80% of each stage of solar-panel manufacturing, dominate wind-energy supply chains, and account for roughly 75% of global lithium-ion battery production.
Its domestic investment in clean technology is double that of the U.S. and EU combined, providing the massive industrial base underpinning its global expansion. This scale has drastically reduced global renewable-energy costs, making decarbonization economically viable for developing countries such as Brazil.
In this sense, the Sino–Brazilian partnership materializes in capital flows and concrete projects that have made significant qualitative leaps under the Lula administration. In 2023, Chinese investment in Brazil rose 33%, reaching USD 1.73 billion. Notably, 72% of the projects targeted clean or sustainable technologies. The most significant figure, however, is that 83% of these projects were greenfield, i.e., involving the construction of new productive facilities on Brazilian soil. Besides not increasing the host country’s sovereign debt—since financial risk remains on Chinese companies’ balance sheets, dispelling notions of a so-called “debt trap”—this demonstrates a long-term commitment to building productive capacity within Brazil, a sharp contrast with the earlier phase of Sino–Brazilian cooperation dominated by mergers and acquisitions.
Brazil’s automotive sector is being reshaped by historic investments from Chinese manufacturers such as BYD and Great Wall Motors (GWM), which are building manufacturing complexes in direct response to Brazil’s tariffs on imported EVs, set to rise gradually to 35% by 2026. This fiscal policy stimulates local production, aligning Chinese commercial interests with Brazil’s industrial-policy objectives, such as the Nova Indústria Brasilplan.
In the energy sector, the transition to renewable sources is futile without a robust grid capable of transmitting that energy efficiently. State Grid has become a central player in this area. In a 2024 auction, the package totaled 4,471 km of new transmission lines; State Grid won the largest lot, about 1,513 km. The company’s project was estimated at approximately BRL 18.1 billion (roughly USD 3.6 billion), and it further announced plans to invest around BRL 200 billion (about USD 40 billion) in Brazil’s electricity sector.
This is the fundamental infrastructure that unlocks Brazil’s full renewable-energy potential.
Another key point is that, beyond economic and technological impacts, Brazil’s energy transition also entails significant social consequences. According to a 2025 report by the Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE), although the country has achieved near-universal electrification, challenges to universal access persist, as does the risk of deepening regional inequalities in the distribution of the transition’s benefits. EPE highlights the importance of public policies that promote social and territorial inclusion, especially for communities in remote or traditional areas that have historically struggled to access quality energy.
Moreover, information from the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME)indicates that the expansion of renewables in Brazil has generated formal, skilled jobs, creating economic opportunities in regions such as the Northeast and Center-West. The strengthening of the local renewable-energy industry—driven by domestic and foreign investment—contributes to sustainable regional development, combats energy poverty, and improves quality of life, with positive effects on public health and the environment.
Thus, Brazil’s energy transition should be understood not merely as a technological and economic challenge but as a process of social transformation that demands effective governance and public policies to ensure the broad distribution of benefits, promoting energy justice and social inclusion in line with national environmental commitments.
Final Considerations
In May 2025, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Casa Civil of the Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation for the First Stage of the Cooperation Plan for the Establishment of Synergies between the Growth Acceleration Program, the Nova Indústria Brasil Plan, the Ecological Transformation Plan, the South American Integration Routes Program, and the Belt and Road Initiative creates a coordinated axis for industrial, technological, and green-infrastructure projects in Brazil, linking regional-integration logistics, energy (including ultra-high-voltage transmission), health, the digital economy, and AI.
In parallel, the two countries adopted the Joint Declaration between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the People’s Republic of China on Strengthening the Brazil–China Community of Shared Future for a Fairer World and a More Sustainable Planet and on the Joint Defense of Multilateralism, which enshrines the diversification of the economic agenda and political-diplomatic coordination within the G20 and BRICS, with emphasis on climate finance and low-carbon productive chains.
This landmark inaugurates a process of consolidation and upgradingof Sino–Brazilian relations beyond the primary-goods agenda, with emphasis on industrial and sustainable investments. Among the more than 20 instruments signed in Beijing in 2025—besides the synergy MoU—there were specific instruments on AI, a technology-transfer center, sustainable mining (2025–2026), peaceful nuclear cooperation, the digital economy, and financial agreements (including a currency swap), signaling deeper local productive and technological density. In the same context, Brazil reported additional Chinese investment commitments (on the order of BRL 27 billion, announced at parallel business events), while the Joint Declaration underscored the commitment to expand and diversify trade and to encourage new investment flows in industry, infrastructure, and the energy transition—precisely the vector repositioning Brazil as a green manufacturing platform in the Global South.
In this sense, we conclude that Sino–Brazilian relations transcend conventional bilateral cooperation, representing a paradigmatic reconfiguration of global environmental governance. This South–South cooperation—catalyzed by a geopolitical vacuum and propelled by China’s “Ecological Civilization”—fundamentally restructures Brazil’s energy infrastructure, challenging the North’s normative and financial hegemony.
The staging of COP30 in Belémelevates Brazil within the new Global-South-centered climate agenda, evidencing the fruits of Sino–Brazilian cooperation. This leadership is reinforced by the approval of the “BRICS Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance”, which established climate-finance commitments and upholds developed countries’ historical responsibility to fulfill their financial obligations. It is an opportunity for Brazil and China to showcase achievements already made and their potential—together with other emerging countries—to lead a new cycle of innovation, justice, and climate mitigation aligned with the civilizational imperatives of our time.
Author: Institute for Cultural Exchange and Economic Development of BRICS+
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